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they would welcome the prospects of the people of the Borneo areas obtaining their independence. Subandrio [Indonesia's Foreign Minister] at first said Indonesia has no real objections to Malaysia. Then came Indonesia's violent objections. It defeats me. I can't see any reason for Sukarno's allegations that we are the tools of imperialist powers and are perpetuating colonialism.

Q You said recently that a war in this area would spread into a major war. Is that inevitable?

A You never know exactly how a war will spread. If there is a conflict in Germany, of course we know it would probably lead to a third World War. But this is not necessarily true out here. Russia is too far away, and I see no reason for Russia to support Indonesia. We and the British can handle Indonesia. Indonesia's economic situation is not the kind in which nations normally start a war. They are conditions under which a warring nation would sue for peace. Perhaps the situation would be different if the war spreads—if it came to a free-for-all, with China coming in.

Q Would the U.S. have to fight in that case?

A It would be entirely up to the United States.

Q Are you going ahead with Malaysia, no matter what?

A August 31 is our D Day. On the other hand, if the territories of Borneo feel they should have it earlier, we will have it earlier. Whatever the danger or threat of war, we will not back away from Malaysia. If we back out it would mean we would be living only to fight another day. We must face up to the problem. Let's do it now. If we cannot avoid war, it cannot be helped.

Q Do you consider Indonesia a menace to your security?

A We consider Indonesians to be our friends. Of course, Sukarno doesn't like me. If I were to leave, perhaps the situation might improve. But I don't think my people will allow me to leave.

I've seen lots of Indonesians after they arrive in Malaya. They are not interested in what Sukarno says. All they are interested in is food—rice to eat. They don't worry about Malaysia.

We tried to help Indonesia in the United Nations on the question of West Irian [West New Guinea]. We tried to persuade other members of the British Commonwealth to support Indonesia's case. Yet, after all this, the Indonesian Government turned against us.

IN SUKARNO, "JEALOUSY"—

Q Why, in your opinion, is Sukarno so hostile to Malaya and to the idea of Malaysia?

A In the view of everyone I've talked to, it comes from jealousy. Here we have a successful, highly developed country, so near to Indonesia. This leads to comparisons, favorable to us and unfavorable to Sukarno. It has an adverse reaction on Sukarno's own status.

Then, too, Sukarno is afraid that the Malays' progress may have the effect of winning over to us the loyalty of the Sumatrans and the people in the Celebes who do not like the Javanese.

A third point is that the Indonesian Communists are angry with me for being so outspoken in support of India against China. We collected funds here which were given to Indian defense. We were the first nation to come out against Chinese aggression against India. The PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] was very angry.

Q What was the reason for the December revolt in Brunei?

A If Brunei had not been a rich country there would never have been a second thought about joining Malaysia.

Money is the corrupting influence there. People there are like us. They have the same feelings. But many leaders of the revolt were greedy for money and they tried to instill a hatred of us among the people. Money was the curse in Brunei.

Q Was Indonesia involved in the Brunei revolt?

A Indonesia was behind the revolt. We had information before the revolt that Azahari [leader of the revolt] was having very close contact with the Indonesians and they supported him. Otherwise he would never have dared to start it. And, after the revolt started, Indonesia came out and fully supported the rebellion. No one can start a revolt in Borneo territories and expect to win without support of a stronger outside power.

A "BASTION" AGAINST REDS—

Q What are your objectives in forming Malaysia?

A We want only to build a stable country which will be a bastion against Communism in the area. Our standards of living are high. We have freedom here. We have made a success of parliamentary democracy. We have elections to village councils and on up to the parliamentary level. There is no violence in our elections. Elsewhere people may be shot dead during elections. But we have never had an election incident here.

In the Borneo territories there are few roads and education is very poor. We will make it our responsibility to develop the area.

Q Will Malaysia be neutralist?

A We are not neutral. We are on the side of the West. Western democracy suits us. It fits our way of life. We are members of the Commonwealth, brotherhood.

Russia has tried to set up an embassy here. Yugoslavia has also tried. We refused to have anything to do with this. I think it is best to keep away from contact with any form of Communism. Then you keep out of trouble. If our faith is in God, we will make no pact with the devil.

Q If Malaysia, as you say, is to be a bastion against Communism, why do the Filipinos claim Malaysia will bring Communism to their doorstep?

A If the Philippines are afraid of 3 or 4 million Chinese living in Malaysia, some of whom may be Communists, why are they not afraid of 100 million Indonesians, many of whom are Communists? I don't understand this. I don't even pretend to entertain their fears. The Chinese are here already. If an excuse for aggression [against Malaysia] must be made, at least make it plausible. This excuse cannot convince anyone.

Q What role did the Indonesian Communists play in Sukarno's anti-Malaysian policy?

A The PKI wants to stay in the limelight in Indonesia and wants to take the lead in setting policies. The Communists always want to stay ahead of Sukarno. Sukarno has to go one better to show he is stronger than PKI. He has always been like that.

Then, too, it was clear Britain would not transfer the Borneo territories to a country which could not guarantee safety and happiness of those people. The decision to transfer the territories to Malaysia was a sign of British respect for us. Indonesia was very unhappy about it.

Q Can Sukarno control the Indonesian Communists?

A If Sukarno thinks he can control his Communists, he is the only man in the world who can. Nobody else has ever done it. We saw what happened to Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland of China, and in Korea, and here in Malaya. We know better.

BAY OF PIGS: THE CURTAIN IS LIFTING

That clamp of secrecy on what happened at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, just will not stay put. Information keeps leaking out.

Now it shows: Americans were in far deeper than officials admit. And U. S. air power was ready to go on a moment's notice.

More and more details are breaking through the curtain of secrecy to show how deeply Americans were involved in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

For two years, the official story in Washington has been that the attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in 1961 was an all-Cuban affair. But it is clear now that

several were Air National Guardsmen. All were volunteers. But after word got out that four American pilots died in combat at the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy said this at his news conference on March 6:

"Let me just say about these four men: They were serving their country."

How U. S. helped. These details can now be told.

- In the days just before the 1961 invasion, American frogmen swam to the landing beaches and carefully charted them for the infantry assault that was to follow. These men were civilians under contract to the invaders. All had been underwater-demolition experts in the U. S. armed forces at one time.

- On D day—April 17—one American frogman was with the Cuban under-

the invading troops with attacks on Castro's forces.

- On at least one occasion, Castro jets bearing down on an invasion transport veered off when U. S. Navy fighters came on the scene, not far offshore.

- It was on the last day—April 19—that four Americans were killed in two B-26 bombers over Cuba. Three other Americans did not reach the target area.

Long before the actual attack, American volunteers were working with the Cubans at their secret training base in Guatemala. Gradually, the full scope of their activities is coming to light.

U. S. B-26 pilots hired. On March 7, 1963, the Chicago "Sun-Times" reported that Air National Guard pilots from Alabama, Arkansas and Virginia, "were offered \$2,500 a month by the Central Intelligence Agency to take part in the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961." The newspaper said pilots from the three States were "sought out because the Guard units of those States were the last to fly the B-26 bombers used in the invasion. The World War II bomber was retired from the State units in 1959."

The Chicago "American" identified Brig. Gen. George Reid Doster of the Alabama Air National Guard as tactical commander of the anti-Castro force. General Doster refused to confirm or deny the report, but indicated he would like to tell his story to a congressional committee. He said: "I wish they would call me and let me put my feet on a desk and talk for about eight hours."

It had been reported earlier by "U. S. News & World Report" that at least 18 American airmen went to Guatemala to train Cuban pilots of the B-26 bomber fleet that the invaders had assembled. These men were recruited for combat duty. Later their orders were changed, limiting them to the role of instructors. But when things started to go wrong at the Bay of Pigs, those who wanted to were permitted to go on combat missions. At least 10, maybe more, did so.

There still is no public report by the Administration on how many Americans were involved in the invasion, or what they did. But gradually, after two years of silence, some of those Americans are beginning to tell their experiences. And as their accounts are pieced together, the curtain of secrecy is lifting from the Bay of Pigs.

[END]



B-26 BOMBERS AT SECRET BASE IN GUATEMALA

American airmen hired to fly them were told to expect combat duty outside U. S.

many Americans took part in it, and that U. S. forces were poised, ready to join in.

U. S. Navy jets, their identifying insignia painted out, were lined up on airstrips at Key West, Fla., within easy striking distance of the Bay of Pigs. They never got the signal to go.

A U. S. aircraft carrier, jets ready on her flight deck, was on station near Cuba. Other American jets were in the air almost constantly, patrolling just off the invasion beaches.

American frogmen scouted the beaches in advance of the attack. American combat veterans flew B-26 bombers into the battle zone and piloted planes carrying Cuban paratroopers who were dropped in advance of infantrymen.

None of these men were members of the regular U. S. armed forces, although

water teams that went ashore ahead of the invasion. This American was in a rubber boat that was caught, by chance, in the headlights of one of Castro's jeeps. He was able to escape and get back to the mother ship, standing offshore.

- At least one American is known to have piloted a planeload of Cuban paratroopers from a staging base in Nicaragua to the point where they were dropped back of the beaches. En route to Cuba, they flew low over an American aircraft carrier so the Cubans could see the jets positioned on her deck.

On the second day—April 18—three American airmen flew over the invasion beach. Two, a pilot and copilot, were in a C-54 transport plane that dropped ammunition to the invaders. The third was pilot of a B-26 bomber, trying to support

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